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Constitutional Law-Right to Counsel and Transcript on AppealWaiver-Retroactivity-Post-Conviction Hearing Act
Following his conviction in 1959, the defendant gave notice of
appeal in open court. Two months later the defendant again appeared in open court, and expressed a desire to withdraw his appeal. Although he had been represented by his own counsel
at the trial, the defendant was indigent the second time he appeared
in court, was without counsel, and had not been furnished a transcript of his trial even though he had asked the clerk of court for
one. Four and one-half years later, the defendant filed a petition
for a post-conviction hearing under the North Carolina Post-Conviction Hearing Act.' At the post-conviction hearing the defendant
asserted a denial of his constitutional rights to have counsel on
appeal and a transcript of his trial furnished by the state. The
judge, however, ruled that the defendant had waived his right to
a transcript by the withdrawal of his notice of appeal.' This ruling
was reversed in 1964 by the North Carolina Supreme Court in
State v. Roux.' Accordingly, the case was remanded to the superior
court with an order that the defendant be permitted to appeal to
the supreme court with appointed counsel.
Decisions of the United States Supreme Court dealing with
the rights of an indigent appealing his conviction would seem to
require such a holding. The principles set forth by these decisions
also indicate that the North Carolina Supreme Court was correct
in first ruling on whether the defendant had been denied the right
to counsel and a transcript before deciding whether there was a
waiver of the right to appeal. In Douglas v. California,4 the Supreme Court held that the equal protection clause requires that an
indigent have the benefit of counsel when the merits of his one
and only appeal as of right are decided. Douglas applies to appeals
from criminal convictions in the superior courts of North Carolina,
because a defendant has as a matter of right only an appeal to the

'N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 15-217 to -222 (1953, Supp. 1963). See generally
29 N.C.L. REv. 390 (1951).
'Although the defendant asserted a denial of counsel, the judge apparently did not rule on this question.
8263 N.C. 149, 139 S.E.2d 189 (1964).
'372 U.S. 353, 357 (1963).
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supreme court.'

NOTES AND COMMENTS

Therefore, the court in Roux correctly held that

the defendant as an indigent had a constitutional right to have
counsel appointed to represent him on appeal.
The court in Roux held that under Griffin v. Illinois6 the defendant had a constitutional right to a free transcript of his trial.
However, in Draperv. WashingtoY the Supreme Court established
that an indigent defendant's right to a transcript is not absolute,
but depends upon the circumstances of the particular case.' Where
the indigent needs a transcript of his trial in order to prepare an
adequate record for appeal, the state must provide him with "means
of presenting his contentions to the appellate court which are as good
as those available to a nonindigent defendant . . . ." Assuming
that the defendant in Rou%needed a transcript of his trial in order
to prepare a record for appeal, the court was correct in holding
that he had a constitutional right to a free transcript.'0
The court in Roux was then faced with the question of whether
the purported waiver of appeal by the defendant constituted a
waiver of the constitutional rights to counsel and transcript. The
court ruled that the defendant's withdrawal of his notice of appeal
did not constitute a waiver of his rights of counsel and transcript."
The Supreme Court has recognized that constitutional rights may
be waived by an individual, 2 but has made it clear that the waiver
'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-180 (1953) provides: "In all cases of conviction
in the superior court for any criminal offense, the defendant shall have
the right to appeal, on giving adequate security to abide the sentence, judgment or decree of the Supreme Court; and the appeal shall be perfected and
the case for the Supreme Court settled, as provided in civil actions."
8 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
"372 U.S. 487 (1963).
"Moreover, part or all of the stenographic transcript in certain cases
will not be germane to consideration of the appeal, and a State will not
be required to expend its funds unnecessarily in such circumstances.
If, for instance, the points urged relate only to the validity of the statute
or the sufficiency of the indictment upon which conviction was predicated, the transcript is irrelevant and need not be provided.
Id. at 495-96.
'Id. at 496.
" See also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-4.1 (Supp. 1963), which provides:
"When an appeal is taken under this section the county shall make available
trial transcript and records required for an adequate and effective appellate
review."
" 263 N.C. at 157-58, 139 S.E.2d at 195.
1" See, e.g., Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506 (1962); Moore v. Michigan, 355 U.S. 155 (1957); Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317
U.S. 269 (1942); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938); Patton v. United
States, 281 U.S. 276 (1930).
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of constitutional rights will not be lightly
and that the
Court will indulge every reasonable presumption against the waiver
of fundamental constitutional rights.' 4 In Carnley v. Cochran5
the Court held that before there could be a waiver of the right to
counsel in state criminal proceedings the state must have offered
counsel to the indigent defendant. The Court said: "Presuming
waiver from a silent record is impermissible. The record must show,
or there must be an allegation and evidence which show, that an
accused was offered counsel but intelligently and understandingly
rejected the offer. Anything less is not waiver."'
Although Carnley involved the right to counsel at the trial
level and was based on the due process clause 17 whereas Douglas

involved the right to counsel on appeal and was based on the equal
protection clause,'" this distinction should make no difference in
the application of the Carnley test of waiver to the right recognized
in Douglas.19 The defendant in Roux was not informed of his
right to appointed counsel on appeal. Furthermore, his request for
a transcript had been denied. Under the test of waiver formulated
by Carnley, he did not waive his right to counsel and a transcript.
After holding that the defendant had not waived the right to
counsel and a transcript, the court in Roux ruled that he had not
waived his right to appeal when he had voluntarily and without
duress withdrawn his prior notice of appeal. Although the court
apparently based this holding on a finding that the defendant had
not "intelligently and understandingly" waived the right to appeal,
" Smith v. United States, 337 U.S. 137 (1949).
' See Emspak v. United States, 349 U.S. 190 (1955); Smith v. United
States, 337 U.S. 137 (1949); Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60 (1942);
Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938); Aetna Ins. Co. v. Kennedy, 301
U.S. 389 (1937); Hodges v. Easton, 106 U.S. 408 (1882).
1 369 U.S. 506 (1962).
11Id. at 516.
17Id. at 512-13.
28 372 U.S. at 358.
" In this tradition, our own constitutional guaranties of due process and
equal protection both call for procedures in criminal trials which allow
no invidious discriminations between persons and different groups of
persons. Both equal protection and due process emphasize the central
aim of our entire judicial system-all people charged with crime must,
so far as the law is concerned, "stand on an equality before the bar of
justice .... ." Consequently at all stages of the proceedings the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses protect persons like petitioners from
invidious discriminations.
Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 17, 18 (1956). (Emphasis added.)
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the result should be the same regardless of the nature of the purported waiver of appeal--i.e., without attempting to apply the
Carnley test of waiver. Once a state grants the right to appeal a
criminal conviction,20 an indigent defendant is entitled under Douglas and Griffin- to have this appeal decided with the aid of appointed
counsel and a transcript furnished by the state.2 A holding that
an indigent defendant, uninformed of his rights under Douglas
and Griffin, has waived the right to appeal is a denial of these rights,
since the appeal is in effect being decided without the defendant having the benefit of counsel and a transcript. In short, where an appellate court finds that an indigent defendant was not offered counsel and a transcript following his conviction in the trial court, it
apparently need not inquire further, since any adverse determination of the defendant's right to appeal would necessarily be an unconstitutional denial of the right to counsel on appeal and a transcript.
Roux also involved the retroactive application of Douglas,
decided in 1963. In holding the defendant was entitled to counsel
on appeal in 1959, Roux implicitly held Douglas to be retroactive.
Retroactivity was not discussed in Roux, however; nor has it been
in Supreme Court decisions applying Douglas. The result in Roux
apparently follows the application that the Supreme Court has
given to Douglas. In three instances22 the Supreme Court has
vacated the judgment of a state court where the indigent defendant's
appeal without counsel occurred prior to the time of the decision in
Douglas. In each of these cases, however, the defendant's appeal
was decided in the state court during the interval between the state
court's decision on the appeals of the petitioners in Douglas and
the decision of the Supreme Court in Douglas. Because the decision
2 The Supreme Court has recognized that the right to appeal is not a constitutional right and that the right depends on the state's having provided
for appellate review. See id. at 18; Reetz v. Michigan, 188 U.S. 505, 508
(1903) ; McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684, 687 (1894).
21 The holding in Douglas is expressly limited to apply only to the first
appeal which is granted as a matter of right from a criminal conviction.
The Court stated that it was not dealing with a denial of counsel for the
preparation of a petition for discretionary or mandatory review beyond the
initial appeal granted as a matter of right. 372 U.S. at 356. In a state
having two levels of appellate review, the above statement in the text
should be limited to this extent.
"Daegele v. Kansas, 375 U.S. 1 (1963) (memorandum decision);
Ausbie v. California, 375 U.S. 24 (1963) (memorandum decision); Tabb v.
California, 375 U.S. 27 (1963) (memorandum decision).
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in Douglas would have to apply back to the time the right was denied
the petitioners in Douglas in order to assure equal protection of the
law,28 these cases cannot be considered conclusive as to the retroactivity of Douglas. In Smith v. Crouse,24 however, the indigent
defendant's petition for appointment of counsel for appeal had been
denied some four months before the petitioners in Douglas had appealed to the state court without counsel. In a memorandum
opinion,25 the Supreme Court cited Douglas and reversed the state
supreme court's ruling28 that Douglas was not retroactive; the effect
appears to be a retroactive application of Douglas. In all four of
these cases the Court declined to write an opinion ;27 thus the full
import of the decisions is not clear.28
Unquestionably, many inmates of North Carolina prisons were
indigent at the time of their trial and were not offered counsel for
appeal following their convictions. Under the retroactive application given Douglas in Roux, these individuals have been denied a
constitutional right, i.e., the right to counsel on appeal.
A simple and effective means of asserting the denial of this
right is found in the North Carolina Post-Conviction Hearing
Act, 29 as applied in Roux. General Statutes section 15-217 provides

that no action shall be commenced under the act more than five
years after the judgment resulting from an allegedly unconstitutional conviction unless the petitioner shows the delay was not caused
by laches or negligence on his part."0 One who was denied counsel
2 See United States ex rel. Durocher v. La Vallee, 330 F.2d 303, 310
n.4 -(1964).
378 U.S. 584 (1964) (memorandum decision).
25Ibid.

Smith v. Crouse, 192 Kan. 171, 386 P.2d 295 (1963).
The Supreme Court has treated cases involving lack of counsel at the
trial level arising after the decision in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S.
335 (1963), in the same manner. In Pickelsimer v. Wainwright, 375 U.S.
2 (1964), the Court vacated and remanded ten pre-Gideon convictions back
to the state court "for further consideration in light of Gideon v. Wailtwright."
respect a statement from Mr. Justice Harlan's dissenting
28 In this
opinion in Pickelsimer v. Wainwright, 375 U.S. 2 (1964), seems appropriate: "In the current swift pace of constitutional change, the time
has come for the Court to deal definitively with this important and far
reaching subject [i.e., retroactivity of decisions]."
2 N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 15-217 to -222 (1953, Supp. 1963).
,oN.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-217 (Supp. 1963). It has been held that a state
may attach reasonable time limitations on the assertion of constitutional
rights under a post-conviction hearing act and that a provision similar to §
15-217 is constitutional. United States ex reL. Dopkowski v. Randolph, 262
28

27
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in proceedings occurring more than five years before the decision
in Douglas in 1963 should not be barred by section 15-217, since
one could hardly be considered negligent in failing to assert the
denial of a right that neither he nor anyone else knew existed prior
to 1963. If a time limitation must be placed on the use of the
act in this situation, it is suggested that the limitation should run
from the time of the Douglas decision in 1963 and should certainly
be no shorter than the five-year period of section 15-217. Defendants who were denied counsel on appeal less than five years before
1963 raise a different question, namely whether they should have
the suggested five-year period beginning in 1963 or only such part
of the statutory five-year period as remains after 1963. Although
there is some authority indicating that the defendant would have
only that part of the five-year period remaining in 1963,1 it would
be more in keeping with the purpose of the act to allow such a defendant the full five-year period beginning in 1963.2 Of course,
defendants who were denied counsel subsequent to 1963 call for an
ordinary application of the act and thus pose no problem.
WILLIAM L. STOCKS

F.2d 10 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 1004 (1959). Although such provisions have in some instances been given a strict interpretation, see, e.g.,
United States ex rel. Lilyroth v. Ragen, 222 F.2d 654 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 350 U.S. 939 (1956), the post-conviction hearing acts should not be
construed so strictly that their purpose is defeated. See People v. Reeves,
412 Ill. 555, 107 N.E.2d 681 (1952). Accordingly, it has been held that a
defendant is not barred by such a time limitation if he is feeble minded,
Jablonski v. People, 330 Il. App. 422, 71 N.E.2d 361 (1947), or if the asserted grounds for relief were fraudulently concealed from him. See Merkie
v. People, 15 Ill. 2d 539, 155 N.E.2d 581, cert. denied, 359 U.S. 1015 (1959).
However, a defendant's incarceration will not alone be sufficient to prevent
the running of the limitation. See United States ex rel. Lilyroth v. Ragen,
supra; People v. Austin, 329 Ill. App. 276, 67 N.E.2d 883 (1946).
3 See United States ex rel. Lilyroth v. Ragen, supra note 30, where the
defendant was in Indiana in prison when the Illinois Post-Conviction Hearing Act was enacted. He was returned to Illinois and imprisoned for a
parole violation when only two months of the five-year limitation remained.
It was held that he was barred by the time limitation because he did not
file the petition for review under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act within
the two-month period.
"2See State v. Cruse, 238 N.C. 53, 76 S.E.2d 320 (1953) (purpose of
the act is to provide an "adequate, simple and effective" post-conviction
remedy); State v. Miller, 237 N.C. 29, 74 S.E.2d 513 (1953) (purpose of
the act is to provide an "adequate and available" post-conviction remedy).

